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a b s t r a c t
Man is a social being. Man’s identity, preferences, place and status are defined in reference to society and that
society is the arbiter of man’s success or failure. In this paper I examine societal linkages in the context of
their dissolution, arguing that if the societal link is damaged or broken, man is fundamentally changed. Since
despair evidences eviction from society, I examine despair, the loss of hope, and the behaviors associated
therewith from the perspectives of many disciplines to define despair and to characterize the despairing
individual and his relationship to society. I then develop a model of a goal-oriented, socially-embedded agent
in which the usual concept of the individual is challenged, and hope and despair are fundamental to this
challenge. Using this theoretical framework, I return to the economics literature and examine the extent
to which economics has, at least implicitly, recognized despair without necessarily confronting it either in
theory or policy design, argue why this failure has weakened both our theory and our policy, and suggest a
possible remedy.
© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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b1. Introduction
Man is a social being, in and of society. The nature of this societal
link is essential to defining who man is (Aristotle) since man’s iden-
tity, preferences, place and status are defined in reference to society.
Who he is and is not, as opposed to what he is or is not, are socially
construed, and his behavior, as well as others’ behavior in response
to him, depends on these social construals (Arrow, 1994; Nienass and
Trautmann, 2015). This social dimension of man is stripped out of
most economic analysis, and the atomistic individual, or the method-
ological equivalent of the individual, is left to take decisions based
on his endowments, tastes, and technology, all of which are taken as
given without reference to the society in which he lives. If something
is lost by this approach, it is often argued that it can be regained rel-
atively easily within the context of our individual-centered models
by the careful design of, for example, rules of the game, information
sets, constraints, or institutions. Yet, if society cannot be so easily sub-
sumed, and if the essence of the individual is not immutable but can
be and is changed by society and social interaction, wherefore eco-
nomic analysis? I would like to thank the participants of the 2013 Economics & Society Summer
School, the 2014 Irish Economics and Psychology Conference, and the participants of
theMaynooth University Department of Economics, Finance & Accounting Seminar, the
Michigan State University Department of Economics Theory Seminar, and two anony-
mous referees for their comments. All errors are mine alone.
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2214-8043/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.In this paper I examine societal linkages in the context of their dis-
olution, arguing that if the societal link is damaged or broken, man
s fundamentally changed. Since despair evidences eviction from so-
iety, I examine despair, the loss of hope, and the behaviors associ-
ted therewith, both by the despairing and by society as cause and
esponse.
To establish the importance of despair in western thought, to
efine despair and to characterize the despairing individual and
is relationship with and to society, I examine despair from the
erspectives of many disciplines, from theology to literature and art
o clinical psychology. Having done so, I contrast despair with hope,
ts behavioral opposite, and then develop a model of a goal-oriented,
ocially-embedded agent in which the usual concept of the individual
s challenged, and hope and despair are fundamental to this chal-
enge. Using this theoretical framework, I return to the economics
iterature and examine the extent to which economics has, at least
mplicitly, recognized despair, without necessarily confronting it ei-
her in theory or policy design, argue why this failure has weakened
oth our theory and our policy, and suggest a possible remedy.
. Characterizing despair
.1. Despair in Christian thought
From St. Paul’s second letter to the Corinthians onwards, Chris-
ian theology has defined despair as the loss of hope of salvation. To
e saved, one must repent one’s sins and seek forgiveness. Since all
ins can be forgiven, by God if not by man, no one is excluded from
alvation, from entrance to God’s kingdom, a priori. Yet if the sinner
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wespairs, he determines that his own sins are unforgivable by God and
hat penitence, no matter how sincere, will avail of nothing. In this it
s the sinnerwho damns himself by rejecting God’s capacity to forgive
ather than God rejecting the truly penitent sinner. This perspective
as given weight by Origen and other early scholars of the Church,
ho argued that God would have forgiven even Judas Iscariot and
elcomed him into his Kingdom had he repented rather than judg-
ng his sins to be unforgivable, even by God, and taking his own life
n despair. Later medieval scholars, uncomfortable with the premise
hat all sins were forgivable, qualified this position by suggesting that
he act of suicide signaled impenitence, since it was the Devil who
nduced he who despaired to self-harm and suicide (Altschule, 1967)
hile still leaving open the path to salvation to the truly penitent.
The association of despair with suicide generally and Judas specif-
cally was reflected in art that reached even the illiterate. Despair
as represented by the very recognizable suicide, Judas, paired with
ope, represented by the crucified Christ, or by a suicide alone, defi-
ntly unrepentant even in death, such as Giotto’s fresco in the Arena
hapel in Padua (Barasch, 1999). Despair was personified in morality
lays and other literature as a character, variously named Despaire
r the Devil, who provided the means of suicide, a rusty knife, poi-
on or a noose, to the wavering Christian, Everyman, weighed down
y sin perceived as unforgivable and seeking release (Beecher, 1987;
acDonald and Murphy, 1990). The message was clear, accepted and
entral to medieval theology (Lederer, 2006), so much so that even
uicides that had a secular motive, such as crippling debt, a love af-
air gone wrong, or mental illness, were treated as spiritual despair in
oth law and custom. Specifically, it was common in the Middle Ages
or the bodies of suicides to be left unburied, to be mutilated and for
heir property to be seized or destroyed, thereby financially ruining
nd socially excluding their families (Murray, 2000; MacDonald and
urphy, 1990). The sins of the fathers were visited on their sons.
Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologica (Aquinas, 1947 [1265–
274]), examines despair in the context of his exploration of the 11
assions (emotions). Aquinas characterizes these passions as either
oncupiscible or irascible. Each of the concupiscible passions is di-
ected to the understanding of good or evil absolutely. Each of the
rascible passions is also directed to good or evil, but these passions
eflect what is arduous to obtain or to avoid (Miller, 2012). Thus, the
bject of despair is an unattainable good, well worth attaining but
erceived to be beyond the despairing’s grasp no matter how hard he
ries, leaving him to do without the good (King, 1999). When hope
of one’s own salvation through the grace of God) is given up, that is,
hen one despairs, one is drawn away from the good, from God and
rom one’s fellow man, and into sin. Despair, which destroys hope,
oes not require that one is without faith and consequently does not
elieve in God’s grace, but only that God’s grace does not extend to
neself. This can lead, eventually, to the loss of faith and to the hatred
f God, the worst of all sins (Snyder, 1965).
Luther suggests that, contra Thomas, despair leads to rather
han away from salvation (Snyder, 1965). For Luther, there are two
ources of knowledge: God’s law and the Gospel. Through God’s
aw, man learns that he is born in sin and is, thereby, damned. Man,
hrough the Gospel, which he can only access via God’s law, discovers
od’s mercy, the only means of man’s salvation. God’s law forces
an to recognize that he is damned, and this recognition leads to
espair: he is nothing without God’s grace. This realization opens
o him the knowledge of the Gospel and the prospect of salvation.
espair, the descent into and journey through hell, for Luther, was
prerequisite for salvation. So, too, for Calvin, yet for Calvin despair
fflicts only the pre-conversion elect or those who have not truly
onverted and are thus not of the elect. For Luther, life is a continual
truggle against despair since the spirit is always beset by doubt.
or Calvin, not so, except for those who were not members of the
lect who were forever barred from God’s mercy. The journey to
alvation, in the Protestant tradition, was through hell (despair)here many remained. The Protestant and Thomist portrayals of
espair permeate Western culture. Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight in The
aerie Queene (Spenser, 1978 [1590–1609]) journeyed through hell
o emerge strengthened and saved (Snyder, 1965), as did Bunyan’s
ilgrim Christian in The Pilgrim’s Progress (Bunyan, 1996 [1678]),
hile the lives and deaths of Graham Greene’s protagonists in his
ovels Brighton Rock (Greene, 1938) and The Heart of the Matter
Greene, 1948) exemplify Thomistic despair (Sinclair, 2011).
For Kierkegaard, like Luther, life, the process of discovering one’s
rue self, a self only defined in relation to God, is a battle with de-
pair (McDonald, 2012). Kierkegaard defines three levels of despair:
gnorant despair, in which the individual is ignorant of having a self,
espair in weakness, in which the individual does not try to be him-
elf, and defiant despair, in which the individual recognizes the eter-
al aspect of himself, that which makes him himself, determines to
ecome himself, but rejects God’s essential role in the process (Banks,
004). Thus, despair comes from trying to know oneself without God,
lthough it is only in relation to God that the self, the true self, can be
ealized (McDonald, 2012). That is, in despair one despairs of one’s
wn sins and despairs of the forgiveness of those sins: the sinner,
nd everyone is a sinner, rejects God’s forgiveness, a sin against the
oly Spirit, and thus is unforgivable. In winning the battle with God
o become oneself by oneself, one loses oneself: the self is not de-
ned in the absence of God. To defeat despair one must go beyond
he finite and humanly attainable, have faith in God, have faith in the
nfinite possibility of God’s forgiveness to effect what is humanly im-
ossible, accept God’s judgment and thereby find one’s true self in
elation to God (Podmore, 2009). Kierkegaard’s philosophy mirrors
is own spiritual struggle. It is also the struggle faced in Ibsen’s play
rand (Ibsen, 1912), where the protagonist, the Reverend Brand, un-
ike Kierkegaard, rejects God, and in his defiant despair not only loses
is own life but the lives of his family and his parishioners (Banks,
004).
While Kierkegaard examines despair in the context of man’s rela-
ionship with himself and with God, Gabriel Marcel examines man in
he context of the world in which he lives (Treanor, 2010). Man is de-
ned by his ontological exigencies, his sense of being, and his need for
xperience that transcends thematerial world. This need is accompa-
ied by a sense that something is amiss, that the world is broken, a
issatisfaction that cannot be assuaged, as the transcendence of the
aterial world cannot be achieved on one’s own, that is, without God.
ut, if man does not feel that something is amiss, does not feel dis-
atisfied, and cannot reflect on the need for transcendence, his tran-
cendent exigency will atrophy to the point of absence. He will not
iew the world as being broken yet it is its brokenness that killed his
ranscendent exigency leaving him as only a functional entity. He will
e reduced to a machine-like existence living a life in despair unable
o participate meaningfully in his own reality. Having will replace be-
ng. He will neither be available to himself nor to others (Pamplume,
953). He will be without hope so that the current situation, despair,
s final and irrevocable. He will be alienated from being.
.2. Despair in secular thought
Over the centuries while the understanding and characterization
f despair evolved, despair remained fundamentally defined as the
oss of hope of salvation. Theologians explored what despair meant
o the individual in this life and the next. Philosophers, psycholo-
ists and others, moving away from theological characterizations, ex-
anded the analysis by defining despair more generally as the loss of
ope, subsuming the theological in a more general characterization
f despair.
Steinbock (2007) defines despair, from the perspective of phe-
omenology, as the impossibility of the ground for hope. This
mpossibility is not attached to a particular situation or event, for
ere this the case, while the particular situation would be hopeless
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s(a particular goal could not be achieved), this hopelessness would
be confined to this situation. With despair the impossibility of the
ground for hope encompasses everything. Everything is hopeless: no
goals can be achieved no matter howmuch effort is expended. While
hope is oriented positively toward meaning, despair is oriented
toward lack of meaning. He who despairs perceives himself to be
completely abandoned, by society, by God, or both, now and forever.
He has no control over his life, and so gives up on everything since
nothing is possible. Because despair affects him at the spiritual level,
suicide can be contemplated since life has no meaning, no value,
neither now nor in the future. In despair he has no future, since
nothing is possible, and he cannot retreat to the past since it cannot
redeem the present. He is imprisoned in the present in a life totally
devoid of meaning and to which meaning will not affix.
The evolutionary biologist, Nesse (1999) examines despair as an
emotion, which must be (have been) beneficial since it has survived
the evolutionary selection process. Despair is aroused as a result of
the perception that a goal one has sought to achieve is unobtainable
despite one’s best efforts. It is an emotion that arises along the path
toward a goal, and since the goal is socially construed as important,
recognizing that there is nothing one can do to achieve the goal can
cause one to despair. The goal could be a happy marriage, support-
ing one’s family, having a successful career, or salvation. The point
is that despair is an emotion common across cultures. The question
is, can despair, while painful, have a salutary effect by enabling a re-
assessment of ones goals? From this perspective, the pain and suffer-
ing caused by despair provides a signal that something is wrong and
towhich a response is required. If emotions aid fitness, in a Darwinian
sense, then these emotions, part of the body’s management and re-
source allocation system, would be positively selected for, thereby
improving our species ability to survive.
From Nesse’s perspective there are gradations of despair, despair
that sends the signal that a new path needs to be taken or a goal re-
vised downward, a signal that may only be interpretable after a pe-
riod of stasis during which action cannot be taken, and despair from
which there is no exit. In the former the period of stasis is character-
ized by low self-esteem, lack of initiative, impaired imagination. The
despairing individual is rendered incapable of action and must wait
until the situation clarifies itself so the decision to give up or to per-
severe, but with lowered expectations, can be made. In the latter, the
signal is effective, but the period of stasis endures, as there is neither
a new path nor possible goal revision. All is lost.
Those who despair may feel shame since they deem themselves
to have failed to achieve a goal socially construed as important or to
have transgressed morally. In their review of moral emotions and be-
havior Tangney, Steuwig and Mashek (2007) explore shame. Shame,
at least from the perspective of Western culture (Wong and Tsai,
2007), represents a negative evaluation of the self as well as the per-
ception of a negative social evaluation of the self. When ashamed,
one’s essential self is at issue, and that self is found lacking both by
the individual himself and by society. Shame causes the individual to
withdraw, to distance himself from others, to be defensive, to lose his
ability to empathize with others, to be angry and aggressive to the
detriment of interpersonal relationships. This withdrawal is recipro-
cated by society (Schmader and Lickel, 2006). Feelings of shame lead
to disgust with one’s own “bad self.” Feelings of shame are difficult to
overcome and offer little chance of absolution. Thus, shame is often
linked with transgressive behaviors (Tangney, Steuwig and Mashek,
2007). Society deals harshly with shame and the despair to which it
may lead.
In the psychological literature on despair, despair is referred to
as existential distress (Connor and Walton, 2011), demoralization
(Frank, 1974) or hopelessness (Greene, 1989). Demoralization and
hopelessness, while sometimes comorbid with, are not clinical de-
pression and have distinct clinical symptoms (Clark and Kissane,
2002; Greene, 1989; Henkel et al., 2002; Jacobsen et al., 2006). Forhe hopeless, although not for the non-hopeless depressed, “the fu-
ure holds no possibility of good or fulfillment” (Greene, 1989, p. 657).
emoralization, as first characterized by Frank (1974) “results from
ersistent failure to copewith internally or externally induced stresses
hat the person and those close to him expect him to handle… . The
erson’s self-esteem is damaged, and he feels rejected by others be-
ause of his failure to meet their expectations. Insofar as the meaning
nd significance of life derives from the individual’s ties with per-
ons whose values he shares, alienation may contribute to a sense of
he meaninglessness of life” (Frank, 1974, p. 271). “They feel power-
ess to change the situation or themselves and cannot extricate them-
elves from their predicament” (Frank and Frank, 1993, p. 35). This
ay lead to recklessness, violence and nihilism (Hillbrand and Young,
008). Thus, demoralization is a state of being that affects how indi-
iduals view their world, their place in it, and their experiences of it.
he causes of hopelessness and demoralization are individual, such
s loss, grief, poor health or abuse, and societal, such as cultural dis-
ocation, economic upheaval, unemployment, poverty, or welfare de-
endency (Johnson and Tomren, 1999; Harper et al., 2002; Haatainen
t al., 2004). Demoralization/hopelessness isolates individuals, robs
hem of their self-esteem, their ability to act, to cope, to control
heir own feelings and behaviors, to respond in some/all difficult
ituations, and/or to perceive future opportunities (O’Connor, Fraser
nd Whyte, 2008; Mair, Kaplan and Everson-Rose, 2013). While each
ndividual’s despair is different, the demoraliz/hopeless/despairing
an often be reached and helped, if not cured (Connor and Walton,
011; Hillbrand and Young, 2008). Just as Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight
eeded Úna to save him from Despaire and return him to the path to
alvation in The Faerie Queene, the despairing individual may need a
elping hand.
Common themes run throughout these characterizations of de-
pair. First, despair is a social malady. Despair excludes the individual
rom society (the society of God, ofman or both), a society fromwhich
e has or perceives himself to have been expelled. Second, re-entry
nto that society is or is perceived to be exceedingly difficult, perhaps
mpossible. Third, because the despairing have been expelled from
ociety they are not or do not perceive themselves to be bound by its
onventions. Fourth, social relationships become difficult or impossi-
le. Fifth, the ability to act, to cope even with the quotidian, atrophies
r is lost. Apathy, lethargy, recklessness and suicide are common re-
ponses to despair. Sixth, life is without value or meaning. This state
f may be temporary or permanent. If temporary, life after emerging
rom despair has less value. If permanent, a future, any future, cannot
e imagined.
. Hope: the antithesis of despair
Pecchenino (2011) examines hope, despair’s opposite, from the
erspective of many disciplines to establish its place in economic
hought. From her review of the literature she finds the following.
irst, that most of the theories of hope have a strong future goal
rientation where the future looms large in an individual’s decision
aking process. The present, rather than the future, is discounted.
econd, goal attainment depends on an individual’s or society’s de-
ire and ability to transform what is into what should be or to move
oward what should be or what will be even if that goal is known to
e unattainable through human effort: nothing is impossible. Third,
heories of hope address the process of living, the journey one is
aking, which suggests that one’s preferences and one’s hopes are
edefined by the constraints one faces, such as age or disability. These
heories provide a means of understanding or accepting fortune and
isfortune with equanimity. All is never lost. Fourth, hope is not
rrational but may rely on an individual’s ability to filter, sort and
electively use information. Fifth, the hopeful are in and of society.
In comparing hope and despair we find that hope is about pos-
ibility, despair is about impossibility; hope is about defining and
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echieving goals, despair is about the inability to achieve those goals;
ope is about the future, despair is about the loss of that future. Hope
s the antithesis of despair.
. Despair in economics
.1. Despair and economic man
Hope is transformative. Despair, the loss of hope, is destructive.
he person in despair is not the person he was. He is fundamentally
hanged both individually and societally. The individualwithout hope
as transgressed and as a result is rejected by or determines him-
elf to be rejected by, and thus exists outside of, society. The societal
ramework, generally implicit in economic analysis, within which the
ndividual existed, is dismantled. The individual falls into a void, a
ea of indifference, or, more graphically, Bunyan’s slough of despond
Bunyan, 1996 [1678]). Whether the individual can be saved from
he void and be drawn back into society may depend on the circum-
tances of his expulsion from society, that is whether the individual
xpels himself or society expels him. In the void nothing has value,
either now nor in the future.
.2. Modeling despair: social structure, expectations and goals
In economic analysis an individual is often modeled as an atom-
stic actor who interacts with and obeys the rules of themarket rather
han of society, which does not get even a supporting role in the anal-
sis. The individual makes decisions given his preferences, which are
efined absolutely. Granovetter (1985, p.487) suggests to the contrary
hat “[A]ctors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social con-
ext,… . Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in
oncrete, ongoing systems of social relations.” In a step toward em-
edding social relations, preferences can be defined over individual
dentities (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) which have a social aspect, or,
ith a stronger nod to society, preferences can be socially referenced,
o that how one’s consumption of goods, services or leisure or how
ne’s wealth, income or employment status, or how one’s support
f one’s family compares to others’ determines how satisfied one is.
his preference structure can be adapted so social references, such
s comparisons of income with one’s neighbors are replaced by per-
onal goals or social goals which society deems important to obtain,
uch as a personal or social identity, as in Brekke, Kverndokk and
yborg (2003), Shayo (2009), or Eguia (2013) or aspirations as in
alton, Ghosal and Mani (2015).
To bring society more directly into our analysis, the individual can
e characterized by a preference ordering over a set of goals which
ociety construes as important. Actions must be taken and resources
e dedicated to move toward or achieve those goals. Society, as well
s the individual, measures and validates the goal achievement that
etermines the individual’s satisfaction. Should he falter or fail, by
ociety’s or his own admission, and so determine these goals to be
nachievable, then he will lose hope and fall into despair. In despair
he goals and the society that once characterized him will do so no
onger, and instead will be replaced with a void, a sea of indifference
n which nothing matters, all choices are equally good or bad, and
hoice reveals nothing. If hope is regained, he will return to the fold
ith a preference ordering over a set of goals consistent with mem-
ership in society.
Building on the model proposed by Jeitschko, O’Connell and
ecchenino (2008), suppose individuals plan to achieve a goal or
et of goals all of which are socially construed as important and
oal achievement is measured relative to the social ideal for that
oal. The individual agent has a single preference ordering defined
ver N distinct goals. Individual goals can be multifaceted, such as
aving a good and fulfilling career while providing for one’s family,
aterially and spiritually, and contributing to one’s community ornidimensional, such as obtaining great wealth. As these goals are
ocially construed as important, their social importance determines,
o some extent, their place in the preference ranking. Goal achieve-
ent may require gaining access to, maintaining or improving one’s
lace in society. Since society is not monolithic, gaining access to,
aintaining or improving one’s standing in one social grouping may
onflict with gaining access to, maintaining and improving one’s
tanding in another social grouping. The agent must balance these
ompeting forces, or by pursuing one goal abandon another. While
oal achievement requires individual effort, it also requires social
ecognition and approval, actual or perceived, as well as individual
erceptions of worthiness.
Let(
g1 − g1∗, . . . , gN − gN∗
)
(1)
epresents an individual’s utility, for want of a better term, defined
ver goals, his preference ordering over goals. His personal and social
ell-being is a function of his n = 1,… , N goals, gn, relative to its
ocially determined ideal (bliss point), gn∗, that is, gn − gn∗ , for all
. Assume n(…, gn − gn∗,…) > 0 (<0) for gn − gn∗ < 0 (>0), for all
= 1,… , N and that nn ≤ 0 for all n = 1,… , N. The sign of nm n = m
s positive if the n and m goals are complements, negative if they are
ubstitutes, and zero if they are independent.
Assume one’s goals and the effort, resources – emotional, psycho-
ogical, spiritual, intellectual, and economic – expended, required to
ttain them are related as follows
n − gn∗ = eˆn − en∗(vn) (5)
here
ˆn = en +
∑
m =n
βmnem (6)
here eˆn is the effort the individual puts into the nth goal, which is
he sum of his effort dedicated to the nth goal, en, and any spillover
rom effort dedicated to the other goals, βmnem, for all m, where
mn < 1. en∗(νn) represents the individual’s belief of the social
elief (Orléan, 2004) of the effort required to attain the social ideal,
construct that depends on the society in which the individual
ives both narrowly and broadly defined, where νn is a vector of
onditioning variables – focal points upon which beliefs about goal
are conditioned. Among these conditioning variables could be
he individual’s emotional state (Pfister and Böhm, 2008), social
tructures (Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993), the moral strictures
f the society of which the individual is part (Kaplow and Shavell,
007), the individual’s circumstances that are determined in part
y the individual’s (relative) wealth or poverty (Dalton, Ghosal and
ani, 2015), the neighborhood in which he lives (Ellen and Turner,
997; Atkinson and Kintrea, 2004), or the acute (Buckert et al., 2014)
r chronic stress the individual is under. Goals and the ordering
hereof, the value of individual resources, conditioning variables and
he social beliefs implied depend on context. Finally, achievement
f or movement toward one’s social goal ideals, regardless of effort
xpended, depends on social recognition and approval thereof.
ssume, similar to Eguia (2013), that for each social ideal there
s a minimum distance requirement that ensures social inclusion,
n, where dn is determined by societal expectations and individual
erceptions thereof. If |gn(e) − gn∗| > dn, then, even dedicating all his
esources to goal n will not allow him to achieve social inclusion in
hat social sphere. The individual despairs when |gn(e) − gn∗ | > dn
or all n. Since falling into despair depends on societal expectations
s well as the individual’s perceptions of his own ability to meet
hose expectations, the “sinner” can be damned or damn himself.
Substituting the relationship of effort to goal achievement into
he individual’s utility function, the individual’s task is to allocate his
esources
=
∑
n
en, en ≥ 0 (7)
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eto devise a plan to achieve/move toward his desired goals. Since an
individual’s total resources are a function of his emotional, psycho-
logical, spiritual, intellectual and economic resources, they are not
fixed.
The agent thus optimizes

(
e1 +
∑
m =1
βm1 em − e1∗ (v1), . . . , eN +
∑
m =N
βmNem − eN∗(vN)
)
(8)
subject to his resource constraint (7), nonnegativity, and minimum
distance constraints. The first-order conditions of the agent’s problem
are
 +
∑
m =n
mβ
mn − λ + μn + ωn = 0, n = 1, . . . , N (9)
where λ is the marginal disutility of effort, μn is the multiplier on
the nonnegativity constraint, and ωn is the multiplier on the mini-
mum distance constraint. The multiplier μn > 0 if the optimal choice
of en ≤ 0: all effort is put into the individual’s other goals since the
marginal disutility of effort exceeds the marginal utility of effort in-
vested in that goal either directly or indirectly. The multiplier ωn > 0
if |gn(e) − gn∗ | > dn. Failure to get close enough to any of one’s goal
ideals is self and/or societally assessed: the individual’s resources,
however deployed, are not individually or societally perceived to be
adequate to the task. In this situation nothing of value is possible, so
nothing matters. He is profoundly indifferent to all possible actions
since all are to no avail. Hope is lost.
In this model individuals’ utility is defined over goals. There is an
interplay between the individual and society which determines the
cost of achieving his goals, the resources he has to do so, and the
recognition of success or failure. The utility function does not con-
form to expected utility assumptions since probabilities, whether ex-
ogenous, affected by own actions or conditioned by social forces, are
embedded in the effort required for attainment of one’s goal ideal,
an ideal not fixed since its achievement is socially mediated. Further,
utility is neither separable across goals with different probabilities
of achievement nor across time. Here the perception of time and the
definition of the time horizon can also be socially mediated and vary
from the eschaton to an irrelevance when contemplating the abyss.
Given this structure it is possible to analyze the interactions across
goals, plans to achieve those goals as a result of changes in the social
environment or the specter of despair (see Jeitschko, O’Connell and
Pecchenino (2008), for derivations).
5. Economics of despair
Suicide has been associated with despair since at least the first
century AD. Suicide has also been seen to have economic causes, as
analyzed by Hamermesh and Soss (1974), Marcotte (2003), Ludwig,
Marcotte and Norberg (2009) and Campaniello, Diasakos, and Mas-
trobuoni (2012), among others, without reference to despair but with
reference to an individual’s psychological and/or mental health state.
Hamermesh and Soss (1974) found that reductions in permanent
income, perhaps as a result of unemployment, could cause a rational
individual to value death as preferable to life and so choose to
commit suicide. In their analysis, suicide is a rational choice that
depends on expected income over one’s remaining life, the cost of
maintaining oneself and one’s family at an acceptable level, and one’s
aversion to suicide. While their analysis does not, and is recognized
not to, take all psychological pressures into account, it highlights
some of the key economic variables that may impinge upon the
choice. Following Hamermesh and Soss, economic analysis of suicide
has expanded to include additional variables and possible actions
in the suicide’s choice set. Marcotte (2003) examines attempted
suicide as a, perhaps strategic, cry for help which, if heard, leads toncreased income; Ludwig, Marcotte and Norberg (2009) examines
he negative correlation between anti-depressant use and suicide;
hile Campaniello, Diasakos, and Mastrobuoni (2012) analyze the
ffect of an amnesty on suicide rates in Italian prisons.
Suicide, from the perspective of the despairing individual is un-
ikely to be the result of a cost-benefit analysis, since without hope
othing is of value thus making comparisons of costs and benefits
eaningless: he is indifferent to all options. However, if an individ-
al expels himself from society, rather than society expelling him
|gn(e) − gn∗ | > dn for all n from the individual’s perspective but only
or some n from society’s perspective), the societal linkage may be
rayed but unbroken: while he has given up on society, society has
ot given up on him. All hope is not yet lost. The unsuccessful suicide
o whose aid society rallies, the granting of amnesty by which a sec-
nd chance is granted, or the prescription of anti-depressants by the
aring doctor (highlighting the co-morbidity of depression and de-
pair) provide an opportunity for society, consistent with Connor and
alton’s (2011) and Hillbrand and Young’s (2008) recommendations,
o reach out or to signal its continued engagement with and positive
aluation of the individual, re-instilling hope, bringing the individual
ack into the fold, and reducing the chance of successful suicide.
Suicides born of desperation may be private or public acts. Pri-
ate suicides include those of the cyberbullied who are brutally ex-
elled from their online and, often as a consequence, offline societies
Hinduja and Patchin, 2010). Public suicides are defiant displays, sim-
lar to Giotto’s characterization, that oddly invert Adam Smith’s ob-
ervation that fame, even after death, is a motivator (Ashraf, Camerer
nd Loewenstein, 2005). A public or dramatic suicide can bring atten-
ion to an individual’s desperation and its causes and give the suicide
he last word in his dialog with a society that abandoned him. It can
lso afford a positive, if posthumous, recognition of the individual’s
ife (see Povoledo and Carvajal, 2012; Waterfield, 2012; Vogt, 2012),
nd a shaming of society that shamed him. It can, by defying social
onvention, bring attention to the needs of his family, who stood by
im when greater society did not, who might, thereby be cared for as
consequence of his death: do right by them as you did not do right
y me. The situation of female suicide bombers is similar. In life they
ave no future and their continued existence shames and burdens
heir families. Their suicides, martyrdom, bring honor and metaphor-
cal riches to their families (Victor, 2003). Finally, one can choose to
eave this life in the company of one’s family, the last remnant of soci-
ty to which the suicide clings. Wilson, Daly and Daniele (1995) find
hat those made despondent by significantly reduced circumstances
etermine that not only is their life of no value, but that without them
either are the lives of their family members. Familicide is the only
nswer.
The behavior of the long-term unemployed, like that of the
uicidal, may be better understood if considered through the lens
f despair. Economists have long recognized that sustained unem-
loyment can have severe adverse psychological as well as economic
ffects (see Goldsmith, Veum and Darity, 1995, 1996a, 1996b). While
nemployment itself has been shown to be significantly important
o an individual’s wellbeing, it is not the loss of income, the nar-
owly economic, that accounts for its importance (Blanchflower and
swald, 2004; Clark and Oswald, 1994; Knabe and Ratzel, 2011;
inkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) but the nonpecuniary aspects
f unemployment such as the social and psychological costs of unem-
loyment (Jahoda, Laxarsfeld and Zeisel, 1933). Subsequent studies
how that long-term unemployment is strongly correlated with poor
hysical and mental health, social isolation, social exclusion, low
elf-esteem, low self-efficacy, low self-belief, loss of identity, inability
o act (to organize one’s life, to search for a job), criminal (anti-social)
ehavior, alcohol and drug abuse, self-harm, and suicide (Brenner,
976; Catalano et al., 2011; Choudhry, Marelli and Signorelli, 2012;
ooper, 2011; Goldsmith, Veum and Darity, 1996a, 1996b; Proudfoot
t al., 1997; Stuckler et al., 2011; Wanberg, 2012), behaviors that
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Guggest despair: indifference to options taken and the consequences
hereof.
Should some long-term unemployed individuals fall into despair,
hey may deem their unemployed state, which makes their goals un-
chievable, as a rejection by and expulsion from the society of which
hey were once a valued and respected part. They now find them-
elves outside that society and indifferent to its requirements. For
hose long-term unemployed in a state of despair, active labor mar-
et policies to address long-term unemployment evaluated by Card,
luve and Weber (2013) may be doomed to failure. This is because
hey reinforce societal rejection rather than reestablish the lost so-
ietal connection, and do so precisely when it is most necessary
hat policies succeed, such as in the current Great Recession with
ts hordes of structurally unemployed or in response to technological
isplacement (Frey and Osborne, 2013). While not all unemployed,
ven Gielen and Van Ours’s (2012) unhappy unemployed, despair,
hose who do may be sensitive to perceived and actual slights or may
hoose to distance themselves from the source of their shame, some-
hing labor activation policies make difficult.
Consider the following components of many labor activation
rograms: retraining/upskilling, a temporary job, wage insurance.
ob training, upskilling, and temporary job placements are stan-
ard elements of labor activation programs designed specifically
o return the long-term, generally structurally, unemployed to the
abor market. They are often mandatory as a condition of receiving
ocial welfare payments and can increase the perceived distance to
he socially important goal (Mazerolle and Singh, 2002) and further
ndermine the willingness to undertake the training (Titmuss, 1970;
rey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997) as the individual perceives goal
chievement as impossible in any event. Here the failure to recognize
he unemployed individual’s skills, perhaps now technologically ob-
olete but previously the foundation upon which his earnings were
ased, and the make-work (charity) interpretation of the temporary
ob can re-emphasize the individual’s loss of status, signal that the
ndividual is no longer a member “in good standing” in society,
hat the individual’s previous contributions to that society have no
urrent value and thereby further weaken or break any remaining
ies to society. That is, the policies can push individuals out of society
ven though their intention is to pull them into the labor force.
roviding wage insurance to ease the transition to a lower-wage job
or a worker may, again, reinforce the despairing individual’s feeling
f worthlessness and reduce any remaining commitment to society
contra LaLonde, 2007) rather than having the desired salutary effect.
For policies to be effective in helping those unemployed who are
n despair, they need to be designed taking into account the social
elationship that is broken and that this relationship needs to be re-
aired: the unemployed person must be given cause for hope. These
onsiderations apply not only to the unemployed, but also to the
omeless, whether on the street (Wolch, Dear and Akita, 1988) or
n institutions, such as nursing homes, that are not home (Carboni,
990), to discouraged workers and to those discriminated against
s a result of race, class, family background and/or place of res-
dence (Atkinson and Kintrea, 2004; Bjørnstad, 2006; Heslin, Bell
nd Fletcher, 2012; Körner, Reitzle and Silbereisen, 2012) who also
espair.
. Conclusion
That man is a social being there is no doubt. Society, in its ex-
ectations, rules, strictures, norms, and assessments, forms who we
re, and who we hope to be both individually and as a member of
ociety and then assesses our achievement. While societal linkages
an, perhaps, be pushed to the background when they are stable and
hen one’s place in society is secure, this is not the case when those
inkages are altered, either positively or negatively, since their alter-
tion can induce a change in who one fundamentally is. In studyingespair, the rather dramatic repositioning of an individual from so-
ietal approval to disapproval and from a place inside to a place out-
ide society, the importance of society to defining and redefining the
ndividual is put into stark focus. Thus to understand the decisions
ndividuals take and to make better socio-economic policies that give
ause for hope, society’s active rather than passive role must be ac-
nowledged and modeled. This can be done. There is cause not for
espair but for hope.
eferences
kerlof, George and Rachel Kranton, 2000. “Economics and Identity.” Quarterly Journal
of Economics 115(3), 715–753.
ltschule, Mark D., 1967. “The two kinds of depression according to St. Paul.” British
Journal of Psychiatry 113, 779–780.
quinas, Thomas, 1947. Summa Theologica. New York: Benziger Bros (English transla-
tion by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, in three volumes).
rrow, Kenneth, 1994. “Methodological individualism and social knowledge.” Ameri-
can Economic Review 84(2), 1–9.
shraf, Nava, Colin Camerer, and George Loewenstein, 2005. “Adam Smith, behavioral
economist.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19(3), 131–145.
tkinson, Rowland and Keith Kintrea, 2004. “‘Opportunities and despair, it’s all in
there’: practitioner experiences and explanations of area effects and life chances.”
Sociology 38(3), 437–455.
anks, William, 2004. “Kierkegaard and ibsen revisited: the dialectics of despair in
brand.” Ibsen Studies 4(2), 176–190.
arasch, Moshe, 1999. “Despair in the medieval imagination.” Social Research 66(2),
565–576.
eecher, Donald, 1987. “Spenser’s Redcrosse Knight: despair and the Elizabethan Mal-
ady.” Renaissance and Reformation 23(1), 103–120.
lanchflower, David and Andrew Oswald, 2004. “Well-being over time in Britain and
the USA.” Journal of Public Economics 88, 1359–1386.
jørnstad, Roger, 2006. “Learned helplessness, discouraged workers, and multiple un-
employment equilibria.” Journal of Socio-Economics 35, 458–475.
rekke, Kjell Arne, Snorre Kverndokk, and Karine Nyborg, 2003. “An economic model
of moral motivation.” Journal of Public Economics 87, 1967–1983.
renner, M. Harvey, 1976. US Congress Joint Economic Committee Estimating the Social
Costs of National Economic Policy: Implications forMental and Physical Health and
Criminal Aggression. Washington: US Government Printing Office.
uckert, Magdalena, Christiane Schwieren, BrigitteM. Kudielka, and ChristianJ. Fiebach,
2014. “Acute stress affects risk taking but not ambiguity aversion.” Frontiers in
Neuroscience 8, 1–11.
unyan, John, 1996. The Pilgrim’s Progress. Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth.
arboni, Judith T., 1990. “Homelessness among the institutionalize elderly.” Journal of
Gerontological Nursing 16(7), 32–37.
ard, David, Jochen Kluve, and Andrea Weber, 2013. “Active labour market policy eval-
uations: a meta-analysis.” Economic Journal 120, F452–F477.
atalano, Ralph, Sidra Goldman-Mellor, Katherine Saxton, Claire Margerison-Zilko,
Meenakshi Subbaraman, Kaja LeWinn, and Elizabeth Anderson, 2011. “The health
effects of economic decline.” Annual Reviews of Public Health 32, 431–450.
houdhry, Misbah, Enrico Marelli, and Marcello Signorelli, 2012. “Youth unemploy-
ment rate and impact of financial crises.” International Journal of Manpower 33(1),
76–95.
lark, Andrew and Andrew Oswald, 1994. “Unhappiness and unemployment.” Eco-
nomic Journal 104, 648–659.
lark, David M. and DavidW. Kissane, 2002. “Demoralization: its phenomenology and
importance.” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 36, 733–742.
onnor, Margaret and JoAnn Walton, 2011. “Demoralization and remoralization: a re-
view of these constructs in the healthcare Literature.” Nursing Inquiry 18(1), 2–11.
ooper, Brian, 2011. “Economic recession and mental health: an overview.” Neuropsy-
chiatrie 25(3), 113–117.
alton, Patricio, Sayatan Ghosal, and Anandi Mani, 2015. “Poverty and aspirations fail-
ure.” The Economic Journal forthcoming.
guia, Jon X., 2013. “Discrimination and assimilation.” New York University Working
Paper.
llen, Ingrid G. and MargeryA. Turner, 1997. “Does neighborhood matter? Assessing
recent evidence.” Housing Policy Debate 8(4), 833–866.
rank, Jerome D., 1974. “Psychotherapy: the restoration of morale.” American Journal
of Psychiatry 131, 271–274.
rank, Jerome D. and JuliaB. Frank, 1993. Persuasion and Healing: A Comparative Study
of Psychotherapy, 3rd ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
rey, Bruno and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 1997. “The cost of price incentives: an empirical
model of motivation crowding-out.” American Economic Review 87(4), 746–755.
rey, Carl Benedikt and Michael Osborne, 2013. “The future of employment: how sus-
ceptible are jobs to computerization?” Oxford Martin School Working Paper.
ielen, Anne C. and JanC. van Ours, 2012. “Unhappiness and Job Finding,” Discussion
Paper 2012-011: Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
oldsmith, Arthur, Jonathan Veum, and Jr.William Darity, 1995. “Are being unem-
ployed and being out of the labor force distinct states: a psychological approach.”
Journal of Economic Psychology 16, 275–295.
oldsmith, Arthur, Jonathan Veum, and Jr.William Darity, 1996a. “The impact of la-
bor force history on self-esteem and its component parts, anxiety, alienation and
depression.” Journal of Economic Psychology 17, 183–220.
62 R.A. Pecchenino / Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics 58 (2015) 56–62
M
M
N
N
N
O
O
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
T
T
T
V
V
W
W
W
W
W
WGoldsmith, Arthur, Jonathan Veum, and Jr.William Darity, 1996b. “The psychological
impact of unemployment and joblessness.” Journal of Socio-Economics 25(3), 33–
58.
Granovetter, Mark, 1985. “Economic action and social structure: the problem of em-
beddedness.” American Journal of Sociology 91(3), 481–510.
Greene, Graham, 1938. Brighton Rock. New York: The Viking Press.
Greene, Graham, 1948. The Heart of the Matter. New York: The Viking Press.
Greene, Sheila, 1989. “The relationship between depression and hopelessness: impli-
cations for current theories of depression.” British Journal of Psychiatry 154, 650–
659.
Haatainen, Kaisa, Antiti Tanskanen, Jari Kylmä, Kirsi Honkalampi, Heli Koivumaa-
Honkanen, Jukka Hintikka, and Heimo Viinamäki, 2004. “Factors associated with
hopelessness: a population study.” International Journal of Social Psychology
50(20), 142–152.
Hamermesh, Daniel and Neal Soss, 1974. “An economic theory of suicide.” Journal of
Political Economy 82(1), 83–98.
Harper, Sam, John Lynch, Wan-Ling Hsu, Susan Everson, Marianne Hillemeier,
Trivellore Raghunathan, Jukka Salonen, and George Kaplan, 2002. “Life course so-
cioeconomic conditions and adult psychosocial functioning.” International Journal
of Epidemiology 31, 395–403.
Henkel, Verena, Bussfeld P., Möller H.-J., and Hegerl U., 2002. “Cognitive-behavioural
theories of helplessness/hopelessness: valid models of depression?” European
Archives of Psychiatry and Clinical Neuroscience 252, 240–249.
Heslin, Peter, Myrtle Bell, and Pinar Fletcher, 2012. “The devil without and within: a
conceptual model of social cognitive processes whereby discrimination leads stig-
matizedminorities to become discouraged workers.” Journal of Organizational Be-
havior 33(6), 840–862.
Hillbrand, Marc and John Young, 2008. “Instilling hope into forensic treatment: the an-
tidote to despair and desperation.” The Journal of the American Academy of Psy-
chiatry and the Law 36, 90–94.
Hinduja, Sameer and JustinW. Patchin, 2010. “Bullying, cyberbullying and suicide.”
Archives of Suicide Research 14, 206–221.
Ibsen, Henrik, 1912 In Herford, C.H. (Ed.). The Collected Work of Henrik Ibsen, Volume
III: Brand. London: William Heinemann.
Jacobsen, Juliet, Lauren Vanderwerker, Susan Block, Robert Friedlander, Paul Ma-
ciejewski, and Holly Prigerson, 2006. “Depression and demoralization as distinct
syndromes: preliminary data from a cohort of advanced cancer patients.” Indian
Journal of Palliative Care 12(1), 8–15.
Jahoda, Marie, Paul Laxarsfeld, and Hans Zeisel, 1933. Die Arbeitslosen Von Marien-
thal. Vienna Marienthal: The Sociography of an Unemployed Community. Chicago:
Aldine 1971.
Jeitschko, Thomas, Séamus O’Connell, and Rowena Pecchenino, 2008. “Identity, collec-
tive beliefs, and the allocation of resources.” Economic and Social Review 39(1),
39–54.
Johnson, Troy and Holly Tomren, 1999. “Helplessness, hopelessness and despair: iden-
tifying the precursors to indian youth suicide.” American Indian Culture and Re-
search Journal 23(3), 287–301.
Kaplow, Louis and Steven Shavell, 2007. “Moral rules, the moral sentiments, and be-
havior: toward a theory of an optimal moral system.” Journal of Political Economy
115(3), 494–514.
King, Peter, 1999. “Aquinas on the Passions.” In MacDonald, Scott and Elinor Stump
(Eds.), Aquinas’s Moral Theory: Essays in Honor of Norman Kretzmann, 101–132.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Knabe, Andreas and Steffan Ratzel, 2011. “Quantifying the psychological costs of unem-
ployment: the role of permanent income.” Applied Economics 43(21), 2751–2763.
Körner, Astrid, Matthias Reitzle, and Rainer Silbereisen, 2012. “Work-related demands
and life satisfaction: the effects of engagement and disengagement among em-
ployed and long-term unemployed people.” Journal of Vocational Behavior 80,
187–196.
LaLonde, Robert, 2007. The Case for Wage Insurance. Council on Foreign Relations.
Lederer, David, 2006. Madness, Religion and the State in EarlyModern Europe: A Bavar-
ian Beacon. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ludwig, Jens, DaveMarcotte, and Karen Norberg, 2009. “Anti-depressants and suicide.”
Journal of Health Economics 28, 659–676.
MacDonald, Michael and Terence Murphy, 1990. Sleepless Souls: Suicide in Early Mod-
ern England. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mair, Christina, George Kaplan, and Susan Everson-Rose, 2013. “Are there hope-
less neighborhoods? An exploration of environmental associations between
individual-level feelings of hopelessness and neighborhood characteristics.”
Health & Place 18, 434–439.
Mazerolle, Maurice and Gangaram Singh, 2002. “Social support and the reduction of
discouragement after job displacement.” Journal of Socio-Economics 31, 409–422.
McDonald, William, 2012. “Søren Kierkegaard.” In Edward N., Zalta
(Ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition).
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/kierkegaard/.iller, Michael, 2012. “Aquinas on the passion of despair.” New Blackfriars 93(1046),
387–396.
urray, Alexander, 2000. Suicide in the Middle Ages: Volume 2: The Curse on Self-
Murder. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
adia, Campaniello, Diasakos Theodoros, and Mastrobuoni Giovanni. 2012. “Rationa
suicides: evidence from changes in inmates’ expected sentence length.” Carlo Al-
berto Notebooks Working Paper.
ienass, B. and Trautmann S.T., 2015. “Book Review: What about me? The struggle
for identity in a market-based society, by Paul Verhaeghe.” Journal of Economic
Psychology 49, 205–206.
esse, Ronald, 1999. “The evolution of hope and despair.” Social Research 66, 429–
469.
’Connor, Rory, Louisa Fraser, and Marie-Claire Whyte, 2008. “A comparison of spe-
cific positive future expectancies and global hopelessness as predictors of suicidal
ideation in a prospective study of repeat self-harmers.” Journal of Affective Disor-
ders 110, 207–214.
rléan, André, 2004. “What is a Collective Belief?.” In Paul, Bourgine and Jean-
Pierre Nadal (Eds.), Cognitive Economics: an Interdisciplinary Approach, 199–212.
Berlin: Springer.
amplume, Louis and Beth Brombert, 1953. “Gabriel marcel: existence, being and
faith.” Yale French Studies 12, 88–100.
ecchenino, Rowena, 2011. “Abandon hope all ye who enter here?” Revue de Philoso-
phie Économique 12, 3–28.
fister, Hans-Rüdiger and Gisela Böhm, 2008. “The multiplicity of emotions: a frame-
work of emotional functions in decision making.” Judgment and Decision Making.
3(1), 5–17.
odmore, Simon, 2009. “Kierkegaard as physician of the soul: on self-forgiveness and
despair.” Journal of Psychology and Theology 37(3), 174–185.
ortes, Alejandro and Julia Sensenbrenner, 1993. “Embeddedness and immigration:
notes on the social determinants of economic action.” American Journal of Soci-
ology 98(6), 1320–1350.
ovoledo, Elisabetta and Doreen Carvajal, 2012. “Increasingly in Europe, Suicides ‘by
Economic Crisis.’” The New York Times. Nytimes.com, 14 April.
roudfoot, Judith, David Guest, Jerome Carson, Graham Dunn, and Jeffrey Gray, 1997.
“Effect of cognitive-behavioural training on job-finding among long-term unem-
ployed people.” The Lancet 350, 96–100.
chmader, Toni and Brian Lickel, 2006. “The approach and avoidance function of guilt
and shame emotions: comparing reactions to self-caused and other-causedwrong-
doing.” Motivation and Emotion 30(1), 43–56.
hayo, Moses, 2009. “A model of social identity with an application to political econ-
omy: nation, class, and redistribution.” The American Political Science Review
103(2), 147–174.
inclair, Peter, 2011. “Graham Greene and Christian Despair: tragic aesthetics in
Brighton Rock and The Heart of the Matter.” Renascence 63(2), 131–146.
nyder, Susan, 1965. “The left hand of God: despair in medieval and renaissance tradi-
tion.” Studies in the Renaissance 12, 18–59.
penser, Edmund, 1978. The Faerie Queene, 1590–1609. London: Penquin Books.
teinbock, Anthony, 2007. “The phenomenology of despair.” International Journal of
Philosophical Studies 15(3), 435–451.
tuckler, David, Sanjay Basu, Marc Suhrcke, Adam Coutts, and Martin McKee, 2011. “Ef-
fects of 2008 recession on health: a first look at European data.” The Lancet 378,
124–125.
angney, June, Jeff Steuwig, and Debra Mashek, 2007. “Moral emotions and moral be-
havior.” Annual Review of Psychology 58, 345–372.
itmuss, Richard, 1970. The Gift Relationship. London: Allen and Unwin.
reanor, Brian, 2010. “Gabriel (-Honoré) Marcel.” In Edward N., Zalta (Ed.). The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition) <http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/fall2010/entries/marcel/>.
ictor, Barbara, 2003. An Army of Roses: Inside the World of Palestinian Women Sui-
cide Bombers. New York: Rodale Press.
ogt, Angela, 2012. “Widows of Italian Suicide Victims Make Protest March against
Economic Strife.” The Guardian. Guardian.co.uk, 4 May.
anberg, Connie, 2012. “The individual experience of unemployment.” Annual Review
of Psychology 63, 369–396.
aterfield, Bruno, 2012. “Death in the Morning: How One Pensioner’s Suicide Has
Traumatized Greece.” The Telegraph. Telegraph.co.uk, 5 April.
ilson, Margo, Martin Daly, and Antionetta Daniele, 1995. “Familicide: the killing of
spouse and children.” Aggressive Behavior 21, 275–291.
inkelmann, Liliana and Rainer Winkelmann, 1998. “Why are the unemployed so un-
happy? Evidence from panel data.” Economica 65, 1–15.
olch, Jennifer R., Michael Dear, and Andrea Akita, 1988. “Explaining homelessness.”
Journal of the American Planning Association 54(4), 443–453.
ong, Ying and Jeanne Tsai, 2007. “Cultural models of shame and guilt.” In Tracy, J.,
R. Robins, and J. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of Self-Conscious Emotions, 210–223.
New York, NY: Guilford Press.
